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This paper provides a theoretical model of an open economy credit channel 
including currency mismatch and financial fragility where exporting firms 
have access to international credit but non-exporting firms do not. It 
considers the post-crisis outcome which is predicted to be dramatically 
different for exporters/non-exporters. We examine firms’ access to external 
finance in four Asian economies after 1997 using a large panel of balance 
sheet data.  Our paper demonstrates that firm heterogeneity is critical to 
understanding the open economy credit channel effects post-crisis since 
smaller and less profitable firms are indeed less likely to obtain credit than 
larger, export-oriented firms. 
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1. Introduction 
The circumstances surrounding the Asian crisis have been a fertile ground for new models of 
currency crises and contagion. Among this vast literature the observations of currency mismatch 
in portfolios of firms and the fragility of the financial sector when faced with mismatches in their 
own portfolios (as capital inflows came to a ‘sudden stop’ c.f. Calvo, 1999) have been embedded 
in many of the more prominent models (c.f. Krugman 1998, Furman and Stiglitz, 1998, Radlett  
and Sachs, 1998). These features have now been identified as potential underlying causes of the 
crisis itself and also a reason to believe that the crisis affected financial institutions and real 
activity in the aftermath. Krugman (1998) has stressed that because corporations balance sheets 
determine access to external finance and capital flows influence the domestic currency cost of 
foreign currency borrowing, they are ‘candidates for third generation crisis modelling’. Goldfajn 
and Valdes (1997) and Chang and Velasco (1998, 1999) have emphasized the dependence of 
corporations and financial intermediaries on foreign capital as a reason for twin crises. When a 
sudden stop occurs the withdrawal of funds from banks has the potential to trigger a Dimond-
Dybvig style run depleting reserves that support a fixed exchange rate (causing a currency crisis) 
and reducing external capital available to financial intermediaries (causing a banking crisis).   
Recent papers by Cespedes (2001), Devereux and Lane (2003), Gertler et al. (2003), Choi 
and Cook (2004) and Cook (2004) have explored the implications of currency mismatch and 
dependence of domestic firms and banks on foreign currency sources. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) 
have termed this effect ‘liability dollarization’ to emphasize the significance of foreign currency 
denominated funds on the liability side of the balance sheet. Using sticky-price DGE small open 
economy models these authors simulate the real effects of a crisis in a model where an 
accelerator effect is driven by falling net worth as the exchange rate depreciates in an open 
economy. These papers extend the closed economy modelling and simulations of Carlstrom and 
Fuerst (1997), Bernanke et al. (2000) to an open economy. Sticky-price DGE small open 
economy models are natural extensions of the closed-economy financial accelerator framework, 
with the advantage that allows for a detailed analysis of the dynamics during the aftermath of a 
currency crisis. The disadvantage is that the analysis is carried out within a representative firm 
framework that restricts attention to average behaviour ignoring the possibility that some firms 
might be able to cope better than others after the crisis. The open economy literature in general 
has very limited evidence documenting corporate finance and firm-level activity using panel data   3
to support the simulation work of the authors cited above.
2 With this in mind we have developed 
an open economy model of the credit channel that is a natural extension of the closed economy 
version (Bougheas, Mizen, Yalcin (2006), Diamond (1991), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 
(1992), Repullo and Suarez (2000), and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). Within this framework 
we can explicitly account for firm heterogeneity and thus analyze how a firm’s specific 
characteristics (e.g. size and balance sheet details) are likely to affect its post-crisis performance.  
We expect the processes of currency mismatch, liability dollarization and financial 
fragility to have a heterogeneous effect on the relationships between financial institutions and 
firms. In this paper we seek to explain the heterogeneous effects of the crisis on firms from four 
Asian economies most affected by the crisis – Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea. We 
build a simple theoretical model using Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2001) as building blocks, to illustrate the binding nature of credit after the crisis 
on firms serving domestic markets, and the unconstrained behavior of exporting firms. The 
dichotomy between domestically-oriented firms and exporters derives mainly from the fact that 
for domestic producers credit is more constrained because they have domestic currency collateral 
assets that deteriorate in value after a crisis and are dependent on banks that are themselves less 
likely to obtain funds to on-lend. Exporters on the other hand have international sources of credit 
that are justified on collateralized export revenues that do not deteriorate after the crisis. We 
make use of the Thomson-Primark database 1996 – 2004 to examine firm’s balance sheets and 
profit and loss accounts to consider the post-crisis response of financial composition and real 
performance by different types of firms.  
What our study highlights is the extent to which the high degree of bank dependence by 
certain types of firms in Asian economies made those firms more prone to long lasting effects of 
the crisis as their own creditworthiness declined and fragile financial institutions drew back loans 
as their sources of funds dried up. Crucially for a credit-channel model that argues that firm 
heterogeneity is a major factor in the response to adverse conditions, we are able to shed more 
light on the likely impact of a crisis and subsequent policy stance on firms of different types. 
Domestically-focused firms, which are on average smaller and less profitable, would not benefit 
from the expansion of the export market after a crisis and would be more negatively affected  
than larger firms with international sales. Therefore the crisis itself and the tightening monetary 
                                                           
2 One reason for the lack of evidence thus far is the fact that balance sheet information accrues annually and until 
recently too few years had passed to allow meaningful exploration in panels. To our knowledge the only detailed 
studies of the crisis using firm level data exist for Korea by Borensztein and Lee (2003), which explores the role of 
financial intermediaries in providing credit to corporations, and Gilchrist and Sim (2004), which considers the impact 
of balance sheet factors on investment.    4
policy after the crisis would be likely to affect domestically oriented firms much more than 
exporting firms
3. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents brief stylized facts about the Asian 
crisis, section 3 develops our theoretical model that is used to explore the influence of firm-
specific characteristics on the variation in the composition of external finance as a consequence of 
the crisis. The data sources and empirical methodology are discussed in Section 4 followed by the 
results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The Asian Crisis  
The roots of the Asian crisis are now well documented. Strong investment and GDP growth was 
built on the vast inflows of capital to emerging markets, where the returns were much greater 
than those in more established markets. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Cook (2004) and Choi 
and Cook (2004) illustrate the high dependence of firms and the financial sector in Asia prior to 
the crisis on funds obtained from US or Japanese sources
4.  
Investment in these markets may have been undertaken without a full appreciation of the 
risks involved. Asset markets had become overheated, fixed exchange rates were tied down by 
monetary policy, and these arrangements were taken as implicit guarantees of exchange rate 
levels. Firms borrowed heavily in foreign currency, and banks, which were poorly regulated or 
supervised, were imprudent in lending. The fact that domestic lending to domestic producers was 
justified by assets denominated in domestic currency created the potential for assets and liabilities 
to diverge in value particularly if the domestic currency were to devalue
5. When commercial 
bank credit inflows of $50bn to the region in 1996 shifted to outflows of $21bn in 1997 the 
mismatch in currencies led to a substantial difference on the balance sheet between the domestic 
currency value of assets backing the borrowing and the debts built up by escalating commitments 
                                                           
3 Radlett and Sachs (1998) and Furman and Stiglitz (1998) argue - with empirical support from Baig and Goldfajn 
(2002), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and Goldfajn and Gupta (1999) - that tightening monetary 
conditions made matters worse not better post crisis. Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001, 2004) argue that when 
credit supply responds adversely to increasing nominal interest rates it is better to loosen monetary policy after a 
crisis. We suggest that for domestically-focused  firms tightening monetary conditions will have strong negative 
effects but access to international capital may enable exporting firms to survive and grow after the crisis. In other 
words there is not one story for all types of firms. 
4 Cook (2004) cites some 88% of syndicated bank loans to emerging East Asian countries 1992-97 were from 
industrialized countries denominated in dollars or yen.  The borrowing by domestic banks from foreign banks in 
dollar or yen amounted to between 33.7 percent in Korea and 60.7 percent of total borrowing in Thailand in 
December 1996 according to BIS and US Treasury sources. 
5 Choi and Cook (2004) point out that although asset values of firms might appreciate with a devaluation of the 
currency provided there are not nominal rigidities, the assets of banks, which are denominated in domestic currency 
will not typically appreciate.   5
to loans obtained in foreign currency. This has since become a central plank in models of the 
crisis, as has the financial fragility of firms and financial institutions.  
Post-crisis the depreciation in exchange rates and the subsequent loss of confidence 
caused stock market and property prices to fall, further undermining the creditworthiness of firms 
and financial institutions. Combined with the deterioration of capital flows, firms were unable to 
obtain credit due to the poor state of their own balance sheets and, because the currency crisis 
rapidly affected the stability of Asian financial sectors, weak financial institutions focused on 
restructuring and recapitalizing and reduced their lending to domestic borrowers. Monetary 
policy tightened in the aftermath of the crisis to counter the depreciating currency, which hit 
credit markets particularly hard. International agencies and commercial banks supported the 
countries in the post-crisis period with official assistance and loan rollovers of short-term debt 
and lengthened maturities of existing debts.   
Post-crisis there was a sharp initial deterioration in real investment and GDP growth. For 
all four economies the real investment growth was negative in 1998 as was real GDP growth. 
Indonesia experienced a 46.6% real reduction in investment growth, similar to Malaysia at 
40.5%, Thailand at 37.0, with Korea slightly less sever at 26.8%. GDP was strongly affected by 
investment and fell by 14.4% in Indonesia, 6.9% in Malaysia, 8.0% in Thailand, and 5.5% in 
Korea according to the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, 1998. The most 
severe experiences were in those countries with the most highly leveraged companies prior to the 
crisis – Korea, Thailand and Indonesia. Much of the corporate debt was foreign currency 
denominated therefore the reversal of capital inflows with the subsequent depreciation of the 
exchange rate had a sharp adverse effect on investment and output. Indebtedness of the corporate 
sector measured by external debt to GDP jumped by 150% in Indonesia, and by 50% in Thailand 
and Korea, in Malaysia the jump was more modest at 20%, but over time most countries brought 
these figures back to pre-crisis levels. All four economies bounced back to positive growth from 
1999 and much of the improvement in growth rates was due to the positive impact of the 
devaluation of currencies on the external sector. All four countries experienced a sharp 
depreciation of the exchange rate versus the US dollar in the first year after the crisis, most 
countries (except Indonesia which had political turmoil as well as economic woes) saw a sharp 
appreciation in 1998 followed by several years of mild depreciations but even after six years none 
of the countries returned to their original exchange rates. The current accounts as a percentage of 
GDP in these countries show that after the initial impact of the crisis, modest surpluses emerged 
for all four countries. Exports were relatively competitive while imports were more expensive   6
and the volume of exports to imports rose favoring those companies that were oriented towards 
export markets.  
 
3.  The Theoretical Model 
We build a model with three periods (0, 1, 2). Period 0 is the planning period when all financial 
contracts are agreed and initial investments are made. Period 1 is an interim period when the 
returns on short-term technologies are realized and creditors decide on whether to liquidate firms 
or provide them with new funds. In the final period, the returns of long-term technologies and 
those on short-term technologies that were extended credit the period before are realized and 
financial claims are settled. All agents are risk-neutral and they do not discount the future. 
  There are two countries: a small open economy (domestic economy) and the rest of the 
world. Let e denote the exchange rate (domestic currency units per unit of foreign currency). We 
assume that in period 0 the government pegs the exchange rate at e=1 and that all agents expect 
that the peg will be maintained for the following two periods. In other words the economy is in 
its pre-crisis state with no prior knowledge of a crisis in the future. 
    
3.1. Firms and Technologies 
There is a continuum of firms located in the small open economy. The only difference between 
firms is their endowment of capital that has period 1 market value k. This endowment captures 
any fixed assets that firms possess in period 0. The distribution of endowments is represented by 
the function F and has support on the interval  ] , [
−
−
k k  and this will be a key determinant of 
creditworthiness, access to credit and ultimately the ability to produce goods. There are four 
goods. One is a domestic input that we use as the numeraire. There is a second input that is 
imported from abroad and each unit costs one unit of foreign currency. The other two are 
consumption goods; one is consumed domestically and we refer to it as the ‘domestic good’ and 
the other is consumed abroad and we refer to it as ‘exports’.   
  It takes one period to complete production of domestic goods. Thus, investments are 
made in periods 0 and 1 and revenues are realized in periods 1 and 2, respectively. To produce 
one unit of the domestic good requires one unit of a composite input that consists of a fraction φ 
of a unit of the domestic input and a fraction 1-φ of a unit of the imported input.
6 There is 
demand uncertainty in the domestic market. The price of domestic goods in periods 1 and 2 is 
                                                           
6 To keep things simple we assume that the technology is Leontief. It will become clear that allowing for input 
substitution will only complicate the model without adding any additional insight.   7
equal to p with probability π while with probability 1-π demand vanishes. The demand shocks are 
independently distributed across firms and time. All period 1 profits are distributed to firm 
owners. We assume that investment in the domestic technology is efficient; i.e.  1 > p π .
7 We also 
assume that revenues are observed only by firm owners.
8   
  Production of exports takes two periods. Our model captures two observations made in 
the international trade literature: that large firms are more likely to export, and given that a firm 
exports its export volume is positively related to its size.
9 To this end we assume that firms that 
wish to export need an initial investment of θ units of the domestic input.  In addition each unit of 
export requires one unit of the domestic input.
10 We further assume that firms face capacity 
constraints with respect to exports that are directly related to their size, i.e. their ownership of 
fixed assets. Without any loss of generality we assume that for each unit of assets that they 
possess they can supply one unit of exports.
11 Export revenues are deterministic but the export 
market is still subject to uncertainty since collapse of the domestic market can trigger default to 
domestic and international lenders by exporters. Let 
* p  denote the price of a unit of exports. We 
assume that 1
* > p π . 
 
3.2. Domestic and International Borrowing 
We make the conventional assumption that all firms are financially constrained and they need 
external funds to finance production. We then make three additional assumptions that are 
justified by the data: First, creditors fall into two categories: domestic creditors offering short-
term loans and foreign creditors offering long-term loans
12. Second, the domestic creditors obtain 
                                                           
7The- right-hand side of this condition corresponds to costs given that the exchange rate is pegged. 
8 We can allow creditors to observe revenues. What we actually need is a weaker assumption that is revenues cannot 
be verified by third parties. 
9 There is a large international trade literature that makes a positive link between entry to export markets and firm 
size through sunk costs c.f. Bernard et al. (2003), Bernard and Jensen (2004), Campa (2004), Helpman et al. (2004), 
Roberts and Tybout (1997), Roberts et al. (1997) and Tybout (2003). Empirical support for this view is cited in 
Girma et al. (2004) and Greenaway et al. (2006) for firms from Germany, Italy, Latin America,  Spain, the UK and 
the US. To our knowledge the only studies that use data from East Asia is Aw and Hwang (1995) and Aw et al. 
(2000) that draw the same conclusions from a sample of Taiwanese  and South Korean firms and Kraay (1999) on 
China.  
10 Given that in period 1 there is no purchase of inputs for the production of exports, assuming that only the domestic 
input is used in the production of exports is inconsequential.  
11 We do this not only to impose a limit on exports but also to relate that limit to firm size. We could instead have 
introduced a cost function that increases with production but decreases with k but our formulation is simpler. 
12 This assumption is verified in BIS-IMF-World Bank statistics on external debt, which indicates the proportion of 
total external debt in the Asia Pacific region designated long term debt was 83.1% in 1990 and 73.8% in 2003. Data 
for individual countries reveals similar proportions.    8
their funds from foreign sources
13. Third, following Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), we 
assume that firms can pledge to creditors two types of collateral. When a firm is liquidated 
domestic creditors receive the proceeds from the sales of its assets, k. In contrast, foreign 
creditors are pledged export revenues
14.  
Exporters obtain loans from domestic and international lenders and if domestic creditors 
liquidate the firm then they cannot fulfil their export obligations and will default on their foreign 
loans. Clearly, even if there is no uncertainty directly related to the export market, foreign loans 
are risky. Thus, firms finance domestic sales with domestic loans while they obtain funds from 
abroad to finance exports. They do so because foreign lenders do not wish to participate in 
bankruptcy procedures and thus do not accept the domestic collateral while domestic lenders 
cannot verify export revenues. Nevertheless, we need to make sure that firms have an incentive to 
use the borrowed funds for their intended purpose; namely, to use foreign loans to finance 
exports and domestic loans to finance the production of goods sold domestically.  
We assume that financial markets are competitive and we set the interest rate equal to 
zero. We, first, consider the domestic financial contract. The domestic financial environment is 
very similar to the one considered by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). Given that in period 2 
domestic revenues are not verified and assets are completely depreciated a firm will always 
choose to default rather than make repayments. However, the firm might have an incentive to 
make high repayments in period 1 if the creditors always liquidate the firm’s assets when the firm 
defaults. If the firm meets its financial obligations in period 1 then the lenders offer a new loan of 
the same size to finance next period’s production.
15 
Let R denote the period 1 repayment and q the level of production. These two choice 
variables must satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint  pq pq R pq ≥ + − π ) ( . Given that 
demand does not vanish in period 1, the left-hand side shows the firm’s profits when it does not 
                                                           
13 Evidence from the BIS reporting banks’ summary of international positions indicates that reporting banks’ claims 
by region/country in 2005Q3 were $110.3bn (Asia Pacific), $9.9bn (Malaysia), $17.0bn (Indonesia), $5.2bn 
(Thailand) and $11.1bn (Korea) some of which would be to public/public guaranteed bodies including public sector 
banks as well as private institutions. Domestic money markets are relatively thin in the Asia-Pacific region. 
14 Evidence from Campa and Shaver (2001) suggests liquidity constraints for exporters are less binding, and cash 
flow is more stable because business cycles in foreign markets are not highly correlated. Chaney (2005) suggests that 
this allows these firms to access more external finance for entry to export markets; Girma et al. (2004) and 
Greenaway et al. (2006) show that it is larger and more liquid firms that tend to enter export markets. Our model 
uses export revenues as collateral, which ensures the positive effects on competitiveness of a depreciation are not 
offset by a deterioration in foreign currency value of pledged collateral as in Chaney (2005).  
15 A key difference between the Bolton and Scharfstein economy and ours is that they consider the case of a fixed 
project size while we allow the firm to choose its level of production. A minor difference is that they have allowed 
revenues in the bad state to be positive (however, can be arbitrarily low) while we have set them equal to zero. In 
both cases, the only reason that lenders are willing to grant second-period loans is because the first-period repayment 
is sufficiently high.   9
default. The first term shows period 1 revenues net of loan repayments and the second term 
shows the period 2 expected revenues. The right-hand side shows the firm’s profits when it 
defaults (in that case the creditors liquidate the firm). The constraint can be simplified to 
  R pq ≥ π           ( I C d) 
where the subscript d stands for domestic. The repayment must also satisfy the creditor’s 
individual rationality constraint  k R q ) 1 ( ) 1 ( π π π − + = + .  The left hand equals to the expected 
value of loans and the right hand side shows expected payoffs. The constraint can be written as 
   π π π / ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [ k q R − − + =       (IRd) 
Combining the two constraints we get  k p q ) 1 ( ) 1 ) 1 ( ( π π π − − > − − . Notice that if p is sufficiently 
high the last constraint will be satisfied for any choice of output. As profits are increasing in 
output the optimal strategy would be to borrow as much as possible irrespectively of the level of 
fixed assets (firm size). Therefore we impose the restriction that  0 1 ) 1 ( < − − p π π  which together 
with the above constraint implies that 
   k
p
q







       (1) 
Clearly in equilibrium the constraint will be binding. Intuitively, for high values of p the 
repayment can be set sufficiently high to cover the expected value of the loans: in that case a firm 
would be able to borrow even if it did not possess any collateral. However, this is not the case for 
low values of p and as result the value of collateral sets a limit to a firm’s borrowing capacity. 
  Next, we turn our attention to the export market. Let 
* R  denote the repayment of foreign 
loans that must satisfy the following individual rationality constraint of the foreign creditor 
   π θ / ] [
* k R + =        ( I R f) 
where  k + θ  equals the size of the loan and the subscript f stands for foreign. Note that the 
creditor is repaid with probability π since with probability 1-π the firm is liquidated and therefore 
is unable to meet its obligations in the foreign market. For a firm with assets, k, expected profits 
from exports are equal to k k p − −θ π
* . Setting this expression equal to zero and solving for k we 









        (2) 
can profitably invest in the export market. 
  As we mentioned above, we also need to make sure that firms have an incentive to use 
domestic loans to finance domestic sales and foreign loans to finance exports. It is clear that firms   10
do not have an incentive to use domestic funds to finance exports since they already produce at 
capacity.
16 However, this is not the case with foreign funds which introduces moral hazard. A 
firm may use foreign loans to finance domestic sales but if it does so it will default in period 1.  
This is because if it stays active, the absence of export revenues will reveal the misuse of 
international funds. Misdirection of funds is not in the international lenders’ interests since there 
will not be export revenues to repay them. The following proposition determines which firms will 
obtain loans from international creditors: 
Proposition 1:  
a)  If  1 ) (
* < − p p π none of the firms will receive a foreign loan, and 
b)  If  1 ) (
* ≥ − p p π  only those firms with 
1 ) (
) 1 (








 will receive foreign 
loans. 
Proof: The expected total profits of a firm that uses the foreign funds to finance exports are given 
by  ) ( ] ) [(
* * R k p pq R pq − + + − π π π  while the corresponding profits when the firm uses the funds 
to finance domestic sales and defaults in period 1 are given by  ) ( θ π + + k q p . Then the 
proposition follows by substituting (IRd), (IRf) and (1) in the two expressions and then 
subtracting the second expression from the first one.           ⁯ 
 Thus, there are two conditions that must be satisfied in order for foreign creditors to provide 
loans. The first is that the return on exports must be sufficiently high to ensure the firm can repay 












      ( I C f) 
Notice that 
− > k k
~
, which implies that the incentive compatibility constraint binds to ensure the 
firm is not tempted by the moral hazard. Only those firms with high production capacity earn 
sufficiently high profits from exports to have an incentive to use the funds appropriately.
17 
 
3.3. Currency Crisis 
                                                           
16 A similar conclusion would be obtained had we assumed that they face an increasing cost function. In that case 
foreign lenders would be willing to finance the first-best optimum level.  
17 There are a few papers that use a similar moral hazard problem to analyze how the firm’s net worth (Hoshi, 
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1992), Repullo and Suarez (2000), and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)) or reputation 
capital (Diamond (1991)) determines its access to market and bank finance. In these papers firms can misuse funds 
by investing them in a high-risk technology that also yields some private benefits.    11
Suppose that in period 1 the government is forced to abandon the peg. Let the new value of the 
exchange rate be e=1+x, so that x>0 captures the rate of depreciation. Our interest is in the post-
crisis economy over the remainder of period 1 and period 2
18. 
The devaluation of the domestic currency will affect firms through three distinct channels. 
We refer to the first channel as the financial channel. This raises the distinction between 
domestic lenders that remain solvent and those that become insolvent. Suppose the devaluation 
causes a currency mismatch on the balance sheets of domestic creditors in the post-crisis period – 
this occurs because domestic banks obtain their funds from foreign investors and these liabilities 
(foreign loans owed by domestic banks) are denominated in foreign currency, but their assets 
(loans owed by domestic firms) are in domestic currency. This implies that after the unexpected 
collapse of the currency the value of their assets might fall short of the value of their liabilities, 
thus, driving them to insolvency.  This has an implication for firms. Suppose a firm borrowed 
from a bank that turned out to be insolvent after the crisis. Despite the fact that the firm was 
successful in period 1 it would not receive any new funds in period 1 for production in period 2.  
Even those firms that received funds from banks that remained solvent will be affected by 
the crisis. This is because the devaluation of the currency increases production costs because of 
the higher cost of imported inputs. Given that the size of the second period loan is fixed in 
domestic currency units firms have to cut down production and thus profits.
19 We refer to this 
second channel as the cost of production channel because it has some similarities with the Barth 
and Ramey (2001) cost channel. In Barth and Ramey (2001) a tightening of monetary policy has 
supply-side implications for firms, which must borrow at higher interest rates, and consequently 
produce at higher cost. In our model the currency crisis has a supply-side implication because a 
devaluation increases the cost of imported inputs and with a fixed loan size reduces production 
levels.   
A third competitiveness channel refers to the effects of increased competitiveness as the 
devaluation makes exports cheaper and improves creditworthiness for firms that have access to 
export markets. In what follows, we examine in detail the effects of each of these channels in the 
post-crisis period.
20 
  We first notice that a proportion  π − 1  of all firms would have been liquidated with the 
domestic creditors receiving k, whether or not a crisis occurred. These firms would have failed 
even if the peg had been maintained and from now on we concentrate only on those firms that did 
                                                           
18 The empirical section considers the outworkings of the post-crisis economy over several periods. 
19 Given that banks face a liquidity crisis they are unable to adjust the size of the loan.   12
not fail. We assume that a proportion z of all firms borrowed funds in period 0 from banks that 
were forced to insolvency by the depreciation. We further assume that the distribution of initial 
endowments of this set of firms is identical to the distribution for all firms.  
We first examine the impact of devaluation on the firms that received loans from solvent 
banks and, for the moment, we restrict attention to those firms with 
~ k k < ; i.e. firms that do not 
produce exports and hence are influenced only by the first and second channels. The domestic 
contract is designed so that, given that the peg is maintained, these firms are indifferent between 
repaying R to domestic creditors and defaulting. The devaluation of the currency implies that the 
unit cost of the domestic good has risen to  x ) 1 ( 1 ϕ − + . Given that the size of the second loan is 




) 1 ( 1 ϕ − +
















above argument implies that firms will default on their domestic loans unless creditors accept to 
renegotiate. 
Proposition 2: Consider those firms that received loans from solvent banks with endowments 
~ k k < . If  1
) 1 ( 1
) 1 (
1





















the contract will be renegotiated; otherwise the 
firm defaults and liquidation follows. 
Proof: When creditors liquidate a firm they receive k while if they renegotiate their return will be 











. The first term equals the initial agreed repayment, the second 
term equals the amount by which the repayment must be reduced (which equals the decline in 
profits) in order to induce firms to stay in business and the last term is the size of the new loan. 
The proposition follows by substituting the equilibrium solutions for R and q in the above 
expression and rearranging
21.           ⁯ 
  Next, we turn our attention to those firms that produce exports among those firms who 
received loans from solvent banks, which also benefit from the third channel. We make two 
observations. First, these firms benefit from the abandoning of the peg because the domestic 
currency value of exports increases. Second, if export profits are sufficiently high then the threat 
of default is not credible. We can show the following: 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
20 Given that our analysis is carried within a partial equilibrium framework it ignores any indirect effects of 
devaluation on prices. 
21 Notice that the proposition is automatically satisfied when  0 = x ; i.e. under the peg. Also, the higher the import 
content of production costs, the higher is the likelihood that firms will default.   13
Proposition 3: Consider those firms that received loans from solvent banks with endowments 
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 loans will not be renegotiated. 
       
Proof: The fixed cost θ means firms’ export profits are increasing at an increasing rate in k. 
Export profits of the smallest firm capable of producing exports are given by 
~ ~ ) 1 ( * k k x p − − + θ π . If these profits are higher than the decline in domestic profits (which are 
increasing at a constant rate with k) then firms will not have an incentive to default.  ⁯ 
  
For these firms profits might either increase or decrease with the abandoning of the peg because 
domestic profits decline while profits from exports increase. Nevertheless, overall profits increase 
with firm size. 
  Now, consider those firms that received loans from insolvent banks. These are firms that 
will not receive new loans in period 1. It is clear that firms that do not produce exports will 
default and hence will be liquidated. For firms that produce exports we have the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 4: Consider these firms that received loans from insolvent banks with endowments 
~
k k ≥ . There exists a cut off level for the value of assets 
^
k  such that those firms with 
^
k k ≥ repay 
their loans in period 1 and are not liquidated while those firms with 
^
~
k k k < ≤ default and are 
liquidated. 
Proof: A firm that defaults avoids making the repayment R but sacrifices export profits. 
Therefore a firm defaults if and only if  R k k x p < − − +
~ ~ ) 1 ( * θ π . The proposition follows after 
substituting for R in the above expression and rearranging terms.         ⁪ 
 
These firms that received loans from insolvent banks will cease supplying the domestic market. 
The firms that will remain active after the currency crisis are firms that are sufficiently large and 
profitable and will service only the foreign market.   
 
3.4. Predictions 
In a world without a currency crisis a proportion 1-π of all firms would have faced liquidation by 
failing to meet their financial obligations with domestic creditors. In this section we make 
predictions about the consequences of a crisis in the post-crisis period for firms of different types.   14
Proposition 2 indicates that abandoning the peg pushes firm failures up to ) ( 1
^
k zF π π + − .
22 The 
proportion of non-exporters that survives is equal to  ) ( ) 1 (
~ k F z − π , while the proportion of 
exporters remaining active is equal to  )] ( 1 )( 1 ( ) ( 1 ( [
~
^
k F z k F z − − + − π .  The former can 
renegotiate their loans but the abandoning of the peg forces them to cut down their production 
level, the latter are relatively large exporters that received funds from eventually insolvent banks 
and exporters that received funds from eventually solvent banks.  
A critical linkage in our model is the connection between access to external finance and 
production in the next period. Failure to obtain sufficient credit will result in curtailed output: 
some firms will not produce output at all, others will obtain only short-term domestic finance to 
produce domestic goods, while others will obtain domestic and long-term international finance to 
produce domestic and export goods. This will be accentuated by the post-crisis conditions such as 
domestic demand and export demand influenced by improved competitiveness, but also by 
creditworthiness of the firm as indicated by collateral assets, liquidity, solvency, profitability and 
indebtedness.  
To isolate the effect of credit constraints from demand effects we consider the ratio of 
short term to total debt following Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) and Oliner and Rudebusch 
(1996). We examine sales growth to indicate the level of activity of the firm following Bond et 
al. (2004). We expect to find that creditworthiness and macroeconomic conditions jointly 
influence access to credit and activity of the firm, but the type and scale of finance (and hence by 
implication activity) will be driven by the size of the firm. Our theoretical model predicts that the 
firm’s capital is a critical factor in determining whether a firm is more likely to survive, produce 
domestic goods or export. This leads us to make three predictions from our model as a result of 
the crisis:- 
P1: The number of firm failures increases. We do not observe failure directly, but our model 
predicts the types of firms more likely to fail are those indicated to be less creditworthy and 
relatively small. These will obtain less long-term credit and will have lower sales growth. 
P2: Our model indicates that relatively small and less profitable firms that focus on the domestic 
market face falling demand, worsening balance sheets, and find their external funding is reduced 
(an implicit accelerator mechanism). The net effect on the short term debt-total debt ratio is 
ambiguous, but since firms obtain less external finance sales growth should fall. 
                                                           
22 The former are the proportion z of firms that do not default anyway that receive loans from eventually insolvent   15
P3: Relatively larger firms are more likely to meet the criteria to export (sufficient assets and 
production capacity) and will benefit from improved competitiveness, larger profits, stronger 
balance sheets and therefore have greater access to long-term credit and higher sales growth.  
  Therefore, in common with the closed economy credit channel models, we expect to see 
financially weaker firms obtain less long-term credit as a proportion of total credit offered, but 
some will not be offered credit at all and will fail. In distinct contrast to the closed economy 
models, however, finance may not be offered even to creditworthy firms if financial 
intermediaries cannot obtain the funds to on-lend and this will particularly affect domestic firms 
borrowing from domestic banks. This means that even for an improvement in creditworthiness 
for smaller domestically-oriented firms there may be less improvement in their short-term debt to 
total debt ratio and sales growth compared to exporters. Exporters have the edge because they 
have favorable terms on which to trade in international markets and international lenders that 
accept the collateral they can offer. These features should be apparent in the comparison between 
the response to creditworthiness indicators in debt structure and sales growth for smaller and 
larger firms.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
In this paper we make use of data from the Thomson-Primark database from 1996 – 2004 with 
reference to four countries that were affected in the aftermath of the Asian crisis – Korea, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand. We use a dynamic panel data framework to explain 
manufacturing firms’ debt structure i.e. the ratio of short-term debt in total debt and their sales 
growth using two main sets of variables, which indicate the macroeconomic conditions post-
crisis and firm-specific creditworthiness. Debt structure reveals whether a firm obtains a larger or 
smaller proportion of short-term debt in total debt (a higher or lower ratio), which we use to 
indicate the extent to which it finds external finance more difficult to access compared to firms 
with lower ratios. Sales growth is a measure of the real activity of the firm, which ought to be 
strongly related to access to credit, but with a lag.  
The empirical model used in the estimations is: 
it i it it k t i k
p
k
it v w x y y + + + + = −
= ∑ η β β α 2 1 ,
1
;      t=q+1,...,Ti;        i=1,...,N,                             
                                                                                                                                                                                            
banks and among this subgroup of firms a proportion  ) (
^
k F default. The latter   16
yit is the dependent variable (the short-term debt ratio or sales growth) and yi,t-k represents up to p 
lagged values of this variable. xit is a vector of exogenous variables including GDP growth, the 
interest rate and exchange rate levels to measure macroeconomic conditions after the crisis that 
affect all firms by driving demand for goods and credit. wit are endogenous variables measuring 
the creditworthiness of each firm based on observable balance sheet data including collateral 
asset values, profitability, liquidity, solvency, cash flow and debt to asset ratios. Time dummies 
are unnecessary since macroeconomic variables capture time varying factors for all firms, ηi and 
vit are individual specific effects and disturbance terms respectively. 
We estimate the dynamic panel model described above by employing the differenced 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) following Arellano and Bond (1991), Bond (2002). The 
macroeconomic variables enter as levels since they have no firm-specific effects, but endogenous 
variables are replaced with suitable instruments using lagged values up to t-3. Before we estimate 
our empirical model we reduced the impact of outliers by trimming 0.5 percent of observations 
from upper and lower tails of the distribution for profit, debt, solvency, cash flow and the liquidity ratios 
and sales growth
23. To ensure that we have accurate yearly data we have adjusted the balance sheet 
reports for the date of issue during the year. Most of firms report information on their balance sheets and 
profit (loss) accounts by the end of December (financial year-end) but some report at the end of March 
or other months. We adjust all our firm-specific variables from financial years to calendar years i.e. if a 
firm reports in March variables are re-calculated using data from two years in proportions 25:75. Table 
1 provides the number of manufacturing firms across years and countries. 
We report several results to evaluate our theoretical framework. First, we report results for 
the whole sample of firms in each country to establish whether the relationship between 
creditworthiness indicators and macroeconomic variables is consistent with what we would 
expect. Second, we report results where all variables are interacted with a dummy indicating the 
whether a firm is relatively small or large
24. The interaction term plays a crucial role in separating 
the effects of particular variables on smaller and larger firm types that the theory suggests are 
likely to behave differently in the post-crisis period. This allows us to compare the responses of 
debt structure and sales growth in two ways. We are able to observe whether the differences are 
significant by comparing whether there is a significant coefficient on interaction terms for small 
(or large) firm types – a significant interaction term indicates that the response by firms that are 
                                                           
23 Tangible assets-total asset ratio and maturity take values in the range of zero to one hundred therefore these 
variables are not trimmed. 
24 Firms are classified into categories based on size using lower 25 percent/upper 25 percent of the appropriate 
distribution for real assets in the period before 1997 for all countries. 
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small (or large) differs from the response of the rest of the sample. Depending on the sign we can 
then establish whether the response to creditworthiness or macroeconomic variables is greater or 
lesser for a firm of a particular type. We can also compare the responses for firms that do not 
belong to a particular type to cross check whether our findings are upheld. For example, we 
might find evidence that the response to creditworthiness indicators for small firms is less than 
that for large firms as our theory predicts due to larger and significant coefficients for small firm 
interaction terms v. large firm interaction terms in columns 2 and 3 of Tables 3 and 4, 
respectively. But this should also be confirmed by the finding that the response of ‘not small 
firms’ is greater than the response of ‘not small’ firms in the same columns of each of the Tables.  
The validity of our estimated model is determined by m1 and m2 statistics are computed to 
test for the first and second order correlation. We would expect a negative first order serial 
correlation (m1) but no evidence of second order serial correlation (m2) in the first differenced 
error terms when we have serially uncorrelated error terms. We also report the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions, which is a widely used to test for the suitability of the instruments in 
the GMM procedure. It is asymptotically distributed as chi-square with as many degrees of 
freedom as overidentifying restrictions, under the null hypothesis of the validity of the 
instruments. The Sargan statistic calculated from the two-step procedure is suggested for 
selecting instruments and specifying the model (Arellano and Bond, 1991) as it is 
heteroskedasticity-consistent under the two-step GMM procedure.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Debt Structure. 
Our data shows that smaller firms receive a larger proportion of debt in short-term loans 
compared to larger firms for all four countries in every year. On the basis of our earlier 
predictions we would expect the maturity of the debt to respond to indicators of creditworthiness 
after the crisis, and for larger and more profitable firms we expect the ratio of short-term debt to 
total debt to fall more with an improvement in creditworthiness indicators than for small firms. 
This is because the large firms have more favorable terms to sell their goods, and access to 
international creditors in contrast with domestically oriented firms. The results in Table 3 are 
reported country-by-country and respective columns in each panel show the estimated responses 
of debt structure to variables when the regression is based on the whole sample of firm 
observations in column 1, and results for small and large firm types in columns 2 and 3. The 
results separate the effects of the post-crisis macroeconomic conditions from the effects of   18
creditworthiness indicators for firms of each type. We are able to confirm the predicted effects 
from the theoretical model in our data.  
Turning to the results for the whole sample of firms for each country, we observe that the 
structure of debt maturity is persistent, so that the lagged dependent variable is a significant 
explanatory variable for the current short-term debt to total debt ratio in our empirical model. The 
degree of persistence varies from country to country with Malaysia showing the greatest 
persistence and Korea the least, and Thailand and Indonesia in between, most likely for 
institutional reasons. In all cases the lagged dependent variable is strongly significant at the one 
percent level and the degree of significance does not alter for samples selected by firm type in 
any country.  
Although debt maturity is persistent, balance sheet characteristics that indicate 
creditworthiness also have the expected effects on the maturity structure of firm-level debt in 
each country as predicted. We observe significant negative coefficients on liquidity, collateral, 
and solvency variables in column one for all four countries consistent with the argument that 
these variables are important determinants of access to credit. A firm with deteriorating balance 
sheets (poorer liquidity, collateral, and solvency) will experience an increase in the proportion of 
short-term debt to total debt, other things equal, but a firm with improving financial health 
(higher liquidity, collateral and solvency) will have access to longer maturity debt causing the 
ratio to decrease. This prediction is supported by Campa and Shaver (2001), Girma et al. (2004) 
and Greenaway et al. (2006) who find better financial health is associated with exporting, 
although the latter make a distinction between continuing exporters and new exporters, finding 
that it is existing exporters that display this relationship.   
The ratio of total debt to total assets is a further indicator of financial health: the higher 
the total debt to total asset ratio the more leveraged is the firm in relation to its assets. Here, 
deterioration in financial health results in a decrease in the proportion of shorter term maturity 
debt as the total debt to total asset ratio falls. Hence firms with a higher ratio of liabilities to 
assets are able to obtain fewer additional loans even at short maturities. Greenaway et al. (2006) 
found more leveraged firms were less likely export because they were more likely to be 
financially constrained, which is consistent with our finding that more highly indebted firms will 
tend to obtain less short-term credit other things remaining equal. It is also consistent with the 
idea that successful firms may be more highly leveraged yet will obtain loans with longer   19
maturities because they have good prospects
25. We observe the expected significant negative 
coefficients in our sample for Thailand, Indonesia and Korea and only for Malaysia do we find 
negative but insignificant coefficients, liquidity excepted. This is possibly due to the fact that 
capital controls mitigated the effects of currency depreciation on firms and financial institutions. 
This in itself is a test of our theoretical model since the predictions we derive are driven by 
depreciation of the currency that provide opportunities for exporting firms and threats for non-
exporting firms. In Malaysia, exporters did not experience significant balance sheet influences on 
debt maturity through the exchange rate channel because capital controls were in place (the 
nominal exchange rate remained unchanged from 1999-2004 and therefore there was not the 
same real exchange rate adjustment found in other countries, see Table 2).    
  There is some evidence of significant macroeconomic effects on the ratio of short-term 
debt to total debt. The coefficient on GDP growth rate is negative and significant for Thailand 
and Indonesia and marginally significant at the 10% level for Malaysia; the magnitude of these 
effects is large. All of the countries concerned experienced large nominal and real GDP growth 
rates in the period after the crisis. Lending rates at all maturities also rose, and these had the 
opposite effect on maturity structure, but this is significant only for Korea and Thailand. Only in 
the case of Thailand is there direct evidence that the real exchange rate movement shifted the 
maturity structure of debt. In this case the initial fall in the real exchange rate would have meant a 
larger proportion of short-term debt was held, but as the real exchange rate improved this would 
have been reversed to some extent. There were no significant direct effects for other countries.  
We now turn to the comparison of the response by firms of different types in the post-
crisis period. By distinguishing between small v. large firms that are most likely to be 
domestically and internationally oriented respectively, reveals how these firm types were affected 
in the aftermath of the crisis. The second and third columns of Table 3 report the comparative 
effects of creditworthiness indicators and macroeconomic conditions for small and large firm 
types. As explained earlier, the significance of the interaction term indicates whether the response 
for a firm of the particular type differs from the response for the rest of the sample. Also, by 
                                                           
25 There are two other potential factors that influence this ratio. To the extent that firms hold foreign currency 
denominated debt there can be a n increase in the ratio that reflects the upward revaluations of debt as a result of 
currency depreciation. Equally, should asset values fall with loss of confidence this too will increase the ratio. There 
is some evidence that the impact of the crisis caused the total debt to total asset ratio to increase initially, and 
subsequently to fall. Only in Korea and Thailand did the ratio fall below levels seen pre-crisis; for Indonesia and 
Malaysia the debt to asset ratio increased steadily after the initial jump. We seek to control for these effects by 
allowing the exchange rate to enter the empirical model as a separate variable since it reflects revaluations of debt in 
domestic currency terms and capital flight.    20
comparing the coefficients for firms not of the particular type e.g. not small v. not large we can 
confirm the results from the interaction terms.   
In all cases the signs of the variables for ‘not small’ and ‘not large’ firms remains 
unchanged in comparison with column 1, although the magnitudes differ because the response for 
firms that are small (or large) are omitted. The significance of the interaction term indicates 
whether the response is different from the remainder of the sample, and the sum of the coefficient 
and the interaction term indicates the response by a firm that is small (or large).   
We find that there are strongly significant interaction terms on indicators of 
creditworthiness for small firms in Indonesia and Korea, but not for Malysia or Thailand
26. There 
are few significant interaction terms for large firms in any of the four countries considered.  
Our model predicts that smaller firms with a domestic orientation for their goods and 
domestic finance are likely to have been offered less debt or a shorter maturity of debt increasing 
the maturity ratio in the post crisis period. Larger international oriented firms’ debt is predicted to 
increase and maturity to lengthen as export conditions improve post crisis. These results are 
confirmed by our model, but the comparison of responses to small v. large firms indicates that for 
small firms the coefficients on creditworthiness indicators are less negative than for large firms. 
This suggests that these firms do obtain proportionally more short-term debt to total debt when 
their creditworthiness declines, but also they experience less improvement in the debt structure 
i.e. longer debt maturity as long-term debt takes a greater share of total debt with an improvement 
in creditworthiness indicators compared to large firms. For the same improvement in liquidity, 
solvency, collateral or debt to asset ratios small domestically-oriented firms would obtain less of 
an improvement in access to long-term debt compared to larger exporting firms. This is exactly 
what our model predicts since smaller firms do not have access to export markets or international 
finance and therefore face a double hardship of deteriorating domestic goods markets and 
constrained lending from domestic financial institutions.  
Comparison of the responses for ‘not small’ firms and ‘not large’ firms shows that in the 
majority of cases the response to creditworthiness indicators is greater for the ‘not small’ firms 
                                                           
26 Malaysia and Thailand exhibit exceptional circumstances making comparison between small and large firm 
responses more difficult. Malaysia shows very little response to balance sheet effects for small or large firms because 
exchange controls probably limited any beneficial effects of depreciation after the initial impact of the crisis as 
mentioned earlier. Thailand experienced exceptionally fragile conditions among financial
 institutions which were 
compelled to merge with international banks or consolidate. Thus neither large nor small firms were afforded access 
to substantial funds from these institutions whatever their creditworthiness or market focus and instead firms sought 
alternative sources of external finance. The Bank of Thailand reports annual data on private sector securities issues 
jumped from bhat 213,971m in 1996 to bhat 431,832m  in 1998 and bhat 871,453m in 1999 before stabilising around 
figures closer to the 1998 levels in subsequent years. The majority of these securities issues were shares and medium 
term debentures issued by larger firms. In other words, successful firms sought non-bank external finance      21
versus the ‘not large’ firms for Indonesia and Korea
27. This is a confirmation of the previous 
finding and support for the model. The greater sensitivity of lenders to large as opposed to small 
firms’ balance sheets reverses a conventional finding in empirical closed economy credit channel 
studies (c.f. Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994, Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995). But the reversal of the 
argument is entirely consistent with the theory and evidence on access to export markets reported 
in Bernard et al. (2003), Bernard and Jensen (2004), Campa (2004), Girma et al. (2004), 
Greenaway  et al. (2006), Helpman et al. (2004), Roberts and Tybout (1997), Roberts et al. 
(1997) and Tybout (2003).  We would expect a larger firm size and a healthy balance sheet to be 
key determinants of access to export markets, and therefore improved terms for credit in our 
model also. The domestic focus of small firms’ activities compared to the international export 
focus of larger firms makes size a key distinction as far as lenders are concerned in open 
economy credit channel models but this is also closely linked to profitability. Small firms in Asia 
would have had poor prospects for the use of funds, and since the domestic market was weakened 
by the crisis they would have had low profitability and unhealthy balance sheets
28. The reverse 
would have been true for large firms with a focus on export markets, and in addition these firms 
would have had collateral assets acceptable to international lenders i.e. export revenues. Hence 
there were likely to be few incentives for financial intermediaries to lend long term to small firms 
but greater incentives to lend to large firms. Also, since large firms borrow from domestic and 
international lenders, and international lenders are unlikely to be affected by the shortage of funds 
that affects the domestic lenders, there is less prospect of a supply-side credit crunch for larger 
firms. Thus, when conditions improve for the exporters, following a devaluation, international 
lenders are likely to supply longer maturity funds to those firms with healthy balance sheets.  
The reversal of the conventional result is not restricted to small and large firms. The 
results are repeated for low v. high solvency ratio firms, low v. highly indebted firms, low v. high 
collateral asset firms, more profitable v. less profitable and low v. high liquidity firms (although 
the results are not reported here) with consistent negative signs on collateral, liquidity, solvency, 
profitability and debt variables.  
 
5.2. Sales Growth  
The theoretical model suggests that the currency crisis will have similar repercussions for the 
activity of firms as it does for firms’ access to external finance. The initial effect of the crisis is 
                                                           
27 Again the comparison of Malaysia and Thailand proves difficult for reasons explained earlier.  
28 Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier (1998) on a survey of 1200 Thai firms found that it was the weakness of the 
domestic market that was responsible for reduced borrowing.   22
likely to cause a deterioration in conditions and an adverse effect on sales growth with a lag. This 
will be seen through the impact of macroeconomic conditions (economic growth, interest rates, 
and the real exchange rate) and through indicators of creditworthiness from the balance sheet. All 
firms are expected to find conditions worsen initially, but for some types of firms – the export-
oriented firms – the depreciation of the currency after the crisis is likely to improve real sales 
growth.  
The results for the whole sample of firm observations are reported in column 1 in Table 4, 
and results for small v. large firms in columns 2 and 3. Sales growth is highly cyclical over the 
post-crisis period as the negative coefficient on lagged sales growth demonstrates. Controlling for 
the cyclicality, we examine the influence of balance sheet and macroeconomic variables for the 
four countries that we examined.  
Looking at the whole sample of firms for each country including smaller and larger firms 
the net effect of balance sheet variables and macroeconomic conditions is consistent with results 
from the previous section. Sales growth is positively influenced by the scale of the firm, since the 
coefficient on logarithm of real assets is strongly significant and positive. The debt to asset ratio 
has a consistent negative and significant influence over sales growth for all countries examined 
except Thailand, where it is insignificant. Firms with higher leverage are less likely to export 
because their financial health is poor (c.f. Campa and Shaver, 2001). Other creditworthiness 
indicators play a more peripheral role, but macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth had a 
positive impact on sales growth as we might expect, and the level of the interest rate, which was 
generally much lower in the post crisis period than immediately before and after the crisis, had a 
positive effect on sales growth.
 29 Movements in the real exchange rate had a negligible direct 
effects on sales growth in Malaysia, where capital controls were implemented,  and Thailand. In 
Indonesia where there was a substantial fall in the real exchange rate and a subsequent 
depreciation driven by political events the effect of the prolonged improvement in competitive 
terms was a boost to sales growth as illustrated by the improved export performance (Table 2). In 
Korea by contrast the depreciation of the currency was short lived, and although the real 
exchange rate settled at a lower level it had a negative direct effect on sales growth offset by the 
positive indirect effects derived from lower interest rates and higher output growth.  
Comparing the interaction terms to determine the response of sales growth to 
creditworthiness and macroeconomic indicators, we find that there is no evidence of a 
                                                           
29 Endogeneity is an issue here, since causation between growing indicators of creditwrthiness and sales might run 
either way. We control for endogeneity in estimation with the use of instruments, and infer the relationship between 
profitability, collateral assets, leverage etc in previous years (i.e. from lags used as instruments) and sales growth.    23
significantly different response by small or large firms. But comparison of the responses of ‘not 
small’ and ‘not large’ firms shows that the coefficients are generally larger for ‘not small’ firms 
suggesting that responses to firm size, GDP growth and interest rates were greater for firms that 
are regarded as ‘not small’, consistent with our model. The differential between the coefficients 
for the logarithm of real assets variable (size) shows that there is a very significant benefit to 
greater size, and this is compatible with the observation that larger firms have access to export 
markets and international sources of finance. The fact that sales growth responds to this variable 
more than to others, and the magnitude of the differential between coefficients for ‘not small’ and 
‘not large’ firms, indicates that scale as a access to international markets is more important than 
other indicators of creditworthiness that might allow a firm to access domestic (but not 
international) financial markets. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper presents a simple theoretical model of an open economy credit channel with 
transmission channels driven by currency mismatch between assets and liabilities for both firms 
and financial institutions, and the costs and benefits of depreciation for production costs and 
revenues. Our model predicts that a crisis will lead to more firm failures, but critically that these 
will be predominantly among smaller, less profitable firms with less exposure to international 
markets and finance. We contribute empirically by examining whether the evidence is consistent 
with these hypotheses. Firm level heterogeneity on the balance sheet is vitally important to the 
impact of the crisis. Smaller, domestically focused firms are hit hardest by the crisis because their 
markets are undermined by the crisis and their lenders more likely to withhold funds to less 
creditworthy firms as their own balance sheets are upset by currency mismatch of assets and 
liabilities. For some of these firms the insolvency of their lender will cause them to fail. 
Exporters on the other hand find their markets benefit from an improvement in competitiveness 
which improves their prospects after the initial impact of the crisis. They can obtain funds from 
international lenders unaffected by a credit crunch, and even where they suffer from insolvency 
among domestic lenders the most profitable firms will find that they can continue to produce 
exports. Our results show that firms’ access to external bank finance and sales growth are 
affected by these considerations and critically longer maturity loans are more readily extended to 
larger and more profitable firms with greater access to export markets. 
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MATit debt maturity ratio defined as (short-term debt/total debt)*100 
COLit (collateral) is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets*100,  
LIQit (liquidity) is the ratio of the current assets excluding work in progress and inventories to 
current liabilities i.e. (Current assets- work in progress- stocks)/ (total liabilities – 
shareholders equity- long-term loans - other long liabilities)*100 
SOLVEit (solvency) is the ratio of shareholder’s equity to total assets*100,  
PROFITAit is the ratio of profit before tax to total assets*100,  
DEBTAit is the ratio of total debt to total assets*100.  
LRASSET it  is the logarithm of real assets 
DLRSALEit  is the change in the log of real sales*100 
GDPt is the GDP growth rate,  
INTRt is the Treasury Bill interest rate (percent) 
RFXRATEt,  is the real exchange rate (based on data from the BIS) 
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Notes to Tables 
 
Table 1: Few firms had reported their 2004 figures to Thomson Financial Primark database at 
the time the data were extracted. 
 
Table 3: Robust z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%,  
(1): No. of observations: 716; No. of Firms: 124; (2): No. of observations: 1760; No. of Firms: 334; (3): 
No.of observations 1594; No.of firms: 271, (4): No. of observations: 1175; No.of firms: 200. Estimations 
are based on the firm type dummies that are employed as component of the interaction terms for all 
variables. For example, in the first column we do not use any interaction term while in the second and 
third columns, we use the interaction terms based on TYPE=small and TYPE=large, respectively. The 
hypothesis of having serial correlation based on m2 is rejected while the hypothesis of valid instruments 
based on Sargan test is not rejected in all regressions with 5 percent significance level.  
 
Table 4: Robust z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%,  
(1): No. of observations: 614; No. of Firms: 108; (2): No. of observations: 1361; No. of Firms: 208; (3): 
No.of observations 1707; No.of firms: 257, (4): No. of observations: 342; No.of firms: 147. Estimations 
are based on the firm type dummies that are employed as component of the interaction terms for all 
variables. For example, in the first column we do not use any interaction term while in the second and 
third columns, we use the interaction terms based on TYPE=small and TYPE=large, respectively. The 
hypothesis of having serial correlation based on m2 is rejected while the hypothesis of valid instruments 
based on Sargan test is not rejected in all regressions with 5 percent significance level. A maximum four 
lagged levels of predetermined and dependent variables and levels of exogenous (macro) variables are 
used as instruments in all regressions     
 
 
Table 1: Number of Manufacturing Firms by Country 
 Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand 
1997  117 223 261  191 
1998  118 238 265  181 
1999  121 292 278  175 
2000  118 319 283  174 
2001  118 320 285  175 
2002  117 324 283  171 
2003  113 320 270  171 
2004  0 248  107  37 
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Table 2: Basic Macroeconomic Indicators 
 
Export of goods and services as percentage of GDP 
   Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand 
1997 27.9  33.0  93.3  48.0 
1998 53.0  33.3  115.7  58.9 
1999 35.5  32.4  121.3  58.3 
2000 41.0  37.7  124.4  66.8 
2001 38.2  35.5  116.4  65.9 
2002 32.0  33.9  114.6  64.2 
2003 30.7  35.6  113.4  65.6 
2004 30.9  39.7  121.2  70.5 
Average 36.1  35.1  115.0  62.3 
        
External debt as percentage of GDP   
        
   Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand 
1997 60.5  36.3  48.5  69.4 
1998 157.1  51.1 61.9 93.1 
1999 105.2  37.6 53.9 77.6 
2000 85.5  32.2  47.0  65.0 
2001 80.8  30.6  51.9  58.5 
2002 64.2  30.2  51.3  48.8 
2003 64.7  26.6  47.2  40.3 
2004 63.0  26.1  46.0  32.1 
Average 85.1  33.8  51.0  60.6 
        
Real GDP Growth Rate (Percent)   
        
   Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand 
1997 4.91  5.51  7.70  -1.34 
1998 -13.30  -6.69 -6.70  -10.77 
1999 0.85  10.89  5.80  4.22 
2000 4.78  8.81  8.63  4.40 
2001 3.44  3.03  0.45  1.94 
2002 3.66  6.35  4.12  5.22 
2003 3.60  3.07  5.64  6.74 
2004 5.13  4.64  7.07  6.08 
Average 1.6  4.5  4.1  2.1 
        
Inflation Rate (Percent)    
        
   Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand 
1997 6.1  4.4  2.7  5.6 
1998 57.2  7.5 5.3 8.1 
1999 21.7  0.8 2.7 0.3 
2000 3.8  2.3  1.5  1.5 
2001 11.5  4.3 1.4 1.7 
2002 11.9  2.8 1.8 0.6 
2003 6.8  3.6  1.1  1.8 
2004 6.2  3.6  1.5  2.9 
Average 15.6  3.7  2.3  2.8   28
Table 2 Macroeconomic Indicators (cont.) 
 
Exchange Rate (Per US $)    
        
   Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand 
1997 2909.4  951.29  2.8132 31.364 
1998 10013.7  1401.44 3.9244  41.360 
1999 7855.2  1188.82  3.8000 37.814 
2000 8421.8  1130.96  3.8000 40.112 
2001 10260.8  1290.99 3.8000  44.432 
2002 9317.1  1251.09  3.8000 42.960 
2003 8577.2  1191.88  3.8000 41.485 
2004 8956.4  1145.49  3.8000 40.223 
Average 8288.9  1194.0  3.7  40.0 
        
Gross International Reserves (in million US $) 
        
   Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand 
1997 17396  20405  20899 26968 
1998 23517  52041  25675 29536 
1999 27257  74054  30645 34781 
2000 29268  96198  29576 32661 
2001 28018  102821  30526 33041 
2002 31577  121414  34277 38924 
2003 36253  155355  44576 42148 
2004 36304  199069  66448 49831 
Average 28698.8  102669.7  35327.8  35986.1 
        
Current Account Balance as percentage of GDP 
 
   Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand 
1997 -2.22  -1.59  -5.18 -1.97 
1998 4.27  11.54  13.53  12.66 
1999 4.11  5.50  15.92  10.17 
2000 4.82  2.65  9.14 7.61 
2001 4.19  1.83  8.27 5.41 
2002 3.83  1.11  7.82 5.89 
2003 3.04  1.71  12.98 5.57 
2004 1.12  4.05  13.38 4.44 
Average 2.9  3.4  9.5  6.2 
        
Lending Rates (Percent)    
        
   Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand 
1997 21.82  11.88 9.53 13.65 
1998 32.16  15.25  10.61 14.42 
1999 27.66 9.40 7.29  8.98 
2000 18.46 8.55 6.77  7.83 
2001 18.55 7.71 6.66  7.25 
2002 18.95 6.77 6.39  6.88 
2003 16.94 6.27 6.13  5.94 
2004 14.13 5.90 6.05  5.50 
Average 21.1  9.0  7.4  8.8   29


















MATi,t-1  0.349***  0.324***  0.298*** 0.213*** 0.183*** 0.213*** 
  (5.73)  (4.88)  (5.22) (3.70) (3.37) (3.77) 
PROFITAit  -0.158  -0.088  -0.132 0.045  -0.057 0.042 
  (1.71)*  (0.94)  (1.24) (1.29) (0.33) (1.26) 
PROFITAit*TYPE   0.055  0.027    0.080  -0.042 
    (0.22)  (0.13)   (0.46) (0.27) 
COLit  -0.176  -0.109  -0.257  -0.351*** -0.460*** -0.352*** 
  (1.21)  (0.65)  (1.53) (3.24) (3.87) (2.66) 
COLit*TYPE   -0.397  0.098    0.158  -0.303 
    (1.44)  (0.39)   (0.62) (1.46) 
SOLVEit  -0.168*** -0.252*** -0.146***  -0.082  -0.197*  -0.099 
  (3.19)  (3.55)  (2.82) (1.40) (1.90) (1.46) 
SOLVEit*TYPE   0.222*  -0.334    0.244*  0.151 
    (1.83)  (1.25)   (1.95) (1.19) 
LIQit  -0.124***  -0.147**  -0.168*** -0.141*** -0.247*** -0.134*** 
  (2.75)  (2.11)  (3.30) (2.94) (5.06) (2.83) 
LIQit*TYPE   0.117  0.103    0.154**  -0.322*** 
    (1.51)  (1.62)   (2.23) (3.54) 
DEBTAit  -0.183** -0.294***  -0.172**  -0.151  -0.386***  -0.180 
  (2.21)  (3.42)  (2.04) (1.47) (2.82) (1.49) 
DEBTAit*TYPE   0.514***  -0.288    0.436**  0.096 
    (3.10)  (0.86)   (2.31) (0.59) 
GDPt  -1.370*** -1.655*** -1.230**  -0.194  -0.271*  -0.222 
  (2.70)  (2.77)  (2.27) (1.23) (1.68) (1.13) 
GDPt*TYPE   1.313  -0.737    0.381  0.020 
    (1.47)  (0.66)   (0.71) (0.07) 
INTRt  -0.952**  -0.980**  -0.965**  -0.046 -0.085 -0.002 
  (2.23)  (2.21)  (2.17) (0.24) (0.45) (0.01) 
INTRt*TYPE   0.097  -0.040    0.915*  0.123 
    (0.16)  (0.06)   (1.73) (0.40) 
RFXRATEt  -0.045 0.016  -0.066  0.177 0.209*  0.195 
  (0.43)  (0.13)  (0.55) (1.35) (1.68) (1.49) 
RFXRATEt*TYPE   -0.046  0.024    -0.089  -0.026 
    (0.23)  (0.11)   (1.47) (0.69) 
CONSTANT  24.415**  20.620**  25.807***  -13.472 -15.849 -14.923 
  (2.41)  (2.18)  (2.62) (1.06) (1.34) (1.19) 
m1  -5.69  -5.21  -5.62 -8.03 -7.64 -7.91 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
m2  -0.31  -0.35  -0.34 -0.73 -0.64 -0.60 
  (0.75)  (0.71)  (0.73) (0.46) (0.52) (0.55) 
Sargan Test  61.49 75.16 87.10  122.81  145.97  152.15 
  (0.20)  (0.38)  (0.11) (0.27) (0.28) (0.18) 
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MATi,t-1  0.586***  0.554***  0.554*** 0.334*** 0.301*** 0.304*** 
  (8.34)  (8.00)  (9.40) (5.71) (5.35) (4.91) 
PROFITAit  -0.010  -0.013  -0.011 -0.137 -0.144 -0.174 
  (0.84)  (0.90)  (0.88) (1.25) (1.42) (1.29) 
PROFITAit*TYPE    -0.040  -0.263   -0.090 0.143 
    (1.00)  (1.22)   (0.45) (0.65) 
COLit  -0.180  -0.193  -0.165 -0.125 -0.160 -0.201 
  (1.58)  (1.28)  (1.31) (0.77) (0.83) (1.20) 
COLit*TYPE   0.045  -0.132    0.317  0.083 
    (0.22)  (0.48)   (0.93) (0.23) 
SOLVEit  -0.002  -0.004  -0.003 -0.050 -0.113*  -0.037 
  (0.38)  (0.63)  (0.45) (1.13) (1.73) (0.72) 
SOLVEit*TYPE   0.006  0.052    0.004  -0.115 
    (0.33)  (0.24)   (0.04) (0.74) 
LIQit  -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.017**  -0.080***  -0.084**  -0.114*** 
  (2.66)  (2.60)  (2.47) (2.59) (2.04) (4.31) 
LIQit*TYPE   0.048  -0.060*    0.031  0.085** 
    (1.13)  (1.70)   (0.63) (2.09) 
DEBTAit  -0.010  -0.020  -0.011  -0.154** -0.204** -0.144** 
  (0.99)  (1.42)  (1.06) (2.36) (2.50) (2.09) 
DEBTAit*TYPE    0.022  -0.024   -0.209 0.022 
    (0.93)  (0.07)   (1.10) (0.10) 
GDPt  -0.491**  -0.664***  -0.426*  -1.049*** -1.394*** -1.013*** 
  (2.15)  (2.73)  (1.71) (3.15) (3.53) (3.10) 
GDPt*TYPE   0.826  -0.134    1.315**  0.476 
    (1.35)  (0.25)   (1.98) (0.63) 
INTRt  -0.288  -0.432*  -0.234  -1.230*** -1.578*** -1.125*** 
  (1.40)  (1.94)  (0.99) (3.20) (3.48) (3.10) 
INTRt*TYPE   0.611  -0.146    1.203*  0.577 
    (1.21)  (0.32)   (1.79) (0.77) 
RFXRATEt  0.141 0.159 0.111  0.336*  0.442**  0.299* 
  (1.21)  (1.32)  (0.94) (1.93) (2.40) (1.91) 
RFXRATEt*TYPE   -0.175  0.041    -0.315*  -0.145 
    (1.24)  (0.33)   (1.75) (0.72) 
CONSTANT  -4.831  -2.988  -3.593 -0.537 -2.078 0.134 
  (0.50)  (0.32)  (0.38) (0.05) (0.20) (0.01) 
m1  -7.26  -7.17  -7.37 -6.89 -7.07 -6.53 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
m2  -0.11 -0.24 -0.21  0.08 -0.18  -0.12 
  (0.91)  (0.81)  (0.84) (0.94) (0.85) (0.90) 
Sargan Test  134.47  156.68  152.94 138.09 157.28 147.32 
  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.17) (0.15) (0.39) (0.61) 
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DLRSALEi,t-1  0.003 -0.012  -0.018  -0.166***  -0.182***  -0.192*** 
  (0.04) (0.17) (0.24) (3.76) (4.36) (4.46) 
DLRSALE i,t-2 -0.119***  -0.121***  -0.121***       
  (5.11) (5.08) (5.45)      
LRASSETit  60.277*** 56.831*** 35.520*** 51.656*** 59.784*** 46.741*** 
  (4.28) (3.96) (2.86) (8.47) (8.93) (6.06) 
LRASSETit*TYPE   -0.607  26.516***    -30.078*  11.640 
   (0.05)  (2.98)    (1.83)  (0.92) 
PROFITAit  0.449**  0.363*  0.491***  0.218 0.334 -0.099 
  (2.49) (1.75) (2.78) (0.94) (1.41) (0.36) 
PROFITAit*TYPE   0.096  -0.040    -0.561*  0.827 
   (0.35)  (0.09)    (1.75)  (1.29) 
LIQit 0.015  -0.022  -0.048  -0.170***  -0.123***  -0.161*** 
  (0.31) (0.35) (1.03) (5.95) (4.82) (4.89) 
LIQit*TYPE   0.004  0.130    -0.114  0.191 
   (0.05)  (1.45)    (1.38)  (0.54) 
DEBTAit -0.499**  -0.519***  -0.370**  -0.798***  -0.581***  -1.068*** 
  (2.38) (3.09) (2.13) (4.36) (3.07) (4.70) 
DEBTAit*TYPE   0.011  0.171    -0.538**  0.977*** 
   (0.04)  (0.52)    (2.03)  (2.65) 
GDPt  11.293*** 10.894*** 10.412*** 2.215***  2.015***  2.617*** 
  (9.78) (10.15)  (8.21) (5.34) (4.69) (6.67) 
GDPt*TYPE   0.514  0.912    1.254  -0.495 
   (0.36)  (0.52)    (1.56)  (1.03) 
INTRt  6.296*** 5.939*** 6.001*** 1.177*** 1.113*** 1.056*** 
  (3.59) (3.58) (3.30) (3.65) (3.71) (3.24) 
INTRt*TYPE   0.500  -0.087    0.544  -0.322 
   (0.48)  (0.07)    (1.04)  (0.95) 
RFXRATEt  -1.125***  -1.012***  -0.679***  1.180*** 1.194*** 1.109*** 
  (3.80) (3.32) (2.64) (2.73) (2.92) (2.76) 
RFXRATEt*TYPE   0.033  -0.241    0.231  -0.564** 
   (0.13)  (0.83)    (1.17)  (1.96) 
CONSTANT  15.070*** 13.971*** 12.874*** -1.885**  -1.720**  -2.250*** 
  (5.55) (5.44) (5.23) (2.46) (2.19) (3.04) 
        
m1 -5.05    -5.38    -5.31  -5.64  -5.38  -6.17 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
m2   0.98   0.93    0.85   -1.04  -1.65  -1.38 
  (0.33) (0.31) (0.40) (0.30) (0.11) (0.17) 
Sargan Test   79.91   97.69  94.97  172.75  167.41  163.26 
  (0.17) (0.85) (0.89) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) 
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DLRSALE i,t-1  -0.230***  -0.226*** -0.241*** -0.103  -0.128  -0.120 
  (2.70)  (2.92) (2.96) (0.90) (1.28) (1.07) 
LRASSETit 11.341  0.684  13.595**  110.182***  117.339***  110.891*** 
  (1.48)  (0.06) (2.27) (4.16) (4.60) (4.49) 
LRASSETit*TYPE   11.952  -4.540    12.062  -24.479 
    (0.82) (0.30)   (0.43) (0.64) 
PROFITAit -0.012  -0.071  -0.089*  -0.318***  1.250***  -0.326*** 
  (0.11)  (1.08) (1.90) (4.25) (2.74) (4.23) 
PROFITAit*TYPE   0.091  1.092**    -1.565***  0.515 
    (0.72) (1.98)   (3.43) (0.66) 
LIQt  0.008  0.048 0.007 -0.078 -0.176 -0.089 
  (0.25)  (0.48) (0.26) (0.77) (1.44) (0.80) 
LIQit*TYPE   -0.060  -0.158**    0.149  0.462 
    (0.61) (2.01)   (1.05) (1.36) 
DEBTAit -0.108**  0.255  -0.118**  0.147  0.491  0.094 
  (2.51)  (0.90) (2.38) (1.23) (1.09) (0.78) 
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